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the experiencing subject. In the two final chapters we are confronted with a discussion of the psychological concepts of sensation, idea, memory, sense perception, attention, and the self, followed by a descriptive account of association, imitation, and habit, with a concluding summary upon the general character of psychical events and the nature of will.

It is not the function of a book of this kind to deal largely in novelties. It must rather be judged by the scholarship brought to the execution of the task, by the wisdom of the author in his selection of material, and by the lucidity of the exposition. Upon the first point, there is no room for criticism, although the author appears to be a somewhat strenuous partisan of the more idealistic trends in psychology, and thereby is, perhaps, slightly incapacitated from doing full justice to the opposing views. On the last two points, one's verdict will depend upon the exact public to which the book is conceived to be addressed. If it is intended for the young novice or for the general reader of average intelligence, undoubtedly it will be found too heavy for agreeable digestion. If, on the other hand, it is directed to the mature student who already has some impressions of psychology, but desires a more scholarly and fundamental grasp of the science in its broader intellectual relations, the book should prove of great value. The style is clear and straight-forward, and certain of the critical passages are admirable. As a book to be read and assimilated before attacking such a treatise as Wundt's *Grundzüge*, it ought to serve a highly useful purpose. It might also be re-read with great profit after mastering such a work, for it would afford an excellent means by which to focalize the main issues traversed by the latter.

JAMES ROWLAND ANGELL.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

La fonction de la mémoire et le souvenir affectif. Par FR. PAULHAN.
Paris, Alcan, 1904.—pp. 177.

Less than a third of this book is new. The greater part of it, already briefly noticed in this REVIEW, appeared in the form of articles in the *Revue philosophique* for 1902. The additional sections found in the book deal with the phenomena of memory in general and seem intended to fortify the positions taken in respect to the affective memory in particular.

For Paulhan the reality of the affective memory is not in question. That there are genuine phenomena of emotional recall seems to him sufficiently established by the discussions of Ribot, Mauxion, and others. One misses keenly, however, any precise statement of just what phenomena are to be included under the term 'affective memory.' Does the term refer to the recall of simple feelings of pleasantness and unpleasantness, or is it to be restricted to the more complex forms of the affective life, the emotions? We are nowhere clearly told. The reader is led to infer, however, that only emotional states are in the mind of the writer, since it is from this field exclusively that illustrative material is drawn. But, further, exactly what

is it to remember an emotion? By what test may we distinguish a remembered emotion from one that is just now being freshly experienced? Is the test the presence or absence of a state of recognition? Is it the ability to recall concurrently a moment of the past wherein this emotion was first experienced? Or should a revived affective state have for its differentia the fact that it is made up of images of enfeebled intensity, which, with more or less fidelity, resemble the original emotion? These and similar questions Paulhan does not discuss in any such fashion as to make the reader certain of his position. In fact, the supreme test of a remembered emotion appears to the author to lie in quite a different direction. And since emotions are, in this respect, in the same case as all other mental phenomena, we need only find the general truth and then make special application of it.

Those acquainted with Paulhan's general psychological attitude will not be surprised to know that for him memory is to be understood only as it is seen in opposition to *organization*, to the systematization, that is, of the various elementary facts of the mental life. Let our opinions and beliefs, for example, be fully organized, and we do not speak of *remembering* them. It is only as the opinion or belief was at one time under consideration or once temporarily held that we now remember it. A beginner in geometry may remember that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, but we whose knowledge in these respects is well systematized can hardly be said to *recall* the fact when we have occasion to think it. The function of memory, then, is to preserve and recall whatever in our mental life has survived in a more or less detached, independent, and sometimes neglected state, — whatever has not become so organized as to form an integral part of the tendencies, ideas, and desires that constitute the self. From one point of view, then, the ability to remember gives evidence of a defect; from another it may be considered a decided advantage. It is a defect in so far as it signalizes the lack of that organization which the activity of the self is ever trying to secure. It is an advantage just in so far as it prevents a too rapid disposal, in some inferior system, of materials that could more worthily be organized in some higher system. Hence it often happens that superior minds possess the largest store of memories. In general, the lapse of memories as such and the increase of mental organization seem to run parallel with the change from associations by crude contiguity into those by similarity.

Such, then, is the test by which, according to Paulhan, memories may be recognized. The question of affective memory becomes then quite simple. Our love and esteem for family and friends, the ambitions that daily sustain us, the interests that determine the routine lines of conduct, — all these are bound organically to the self. These are not remembered; but the chagrin or anger of some passing moment, the fleeting delight or the sudden fear of some chance event, — these may still exist as independent elements, and, by that token, these may be remembered.

It is to be noted that these remembered emotions may, and usually do, undergo transformations of greater or less extent. This is the case when a remembered joy seems more joyful, or a remembered fear more frightful. The recollected state can often develop and expand, owing to the absence of hindrances originally present. Or, by reason of contrasts now possible, it may take on a value not possessed at its first appearance. Or it may be purged of the irrelevant accompaniments of its first state, and be revived in a form of hitherto unknown purity. The genetic significance of these transformations is apparent.

If I read the matter rightly, it makes little difference to the author whether the questions usually raised in connection with the problem of affective memory are solved or not. If a given affective state meet the test suggested, that is sufficient to mark the phenomenon as one of memory.

A number of new documents are brought forward in the text, there is an abundance of illustrative material, and the reader is always made to feel the broad and wholesome treatment of one who regards the mind as an evolving organism of ever-increasing complexity. But, personally speaking, the reviewer always finds Paulhan's writings hard to read. The fundamental points of view are, to be sure, always identical. No writer is more self-consistent throughout his various volumes. There are always the analyses and the syntheses, the decompositions, agglomerations, assimilations, play of tendencies, higher and lower systems of elements, and the progressively developing organic self. But there seems always to be a lack of precise and stringent statement in respect to many of the matters about which the reader would like to be enlightened. The half poetic and metaphorical diction that usually prevails leaves the reader often in a state of mildly despairing wonder as to what after all the writer is really meaning to say. The chief contention of this book appears, however, to be that given above.

A. H. PIERCE.

SMITH COLLEGE.

Über Kunst und Künstler. Von P. J. MÖBIUS. Leipzig, J. A. Barth, 1901. — pp. 296.

Die Grenzen der Ästhetik. Von GERHARD VON KEUSSLER. Leipzig, H. S. Nachfolger, 1902. — pp. 165.

L'idéal esthétique: Esquisse d'une philosophie de la beauté. Par FR. ROUSSEL-DESPIERRES. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1904. — pp. 186.

These unpretentious volumes are symptomatic of the increasing interest that is being taken in what may be called 'the æsthetical problem.' The interest in that problem has steadily increased since Fechner published his *Vorschule*, which may be regarded as the first serious effort to establish an 'exact' science of the beautiful. The recent work of Theodor Lipps on the psychological aspect of this problem likewise shows what progress has been made in the direction of systematic study and careful observation of